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OPERATION SILENCE

Contagious "Suicide" of Nazis who Knew too Much

In the first two weeks of February, three prominent West Germans accused of war crimes died mysteriously before they could go on trial and name their accomplices.

The men who knew too much, and who conveniently disappeared from the scene, were Professor Werner Heyde, chief of Hitler's "euthanasia" killings, who was alleged to have committed suicide in his cell on February 13th, five days before his trial opened; Dr Friedrich Tillmann, another euthanasia expert, co-accused with Professor Heyde, who fell to his death in mysterious circumstances one day earlier; and Ewald Peters, Chancellor Erhard's personal security chief, a former SS assassin, who was claimed to have hanged himself in prison soon after arrest.

Journalists in Bonn with good contacts in right-wing circles claimed that the "suicides" were in fact the work of ODESSA, a top-secret neo-nazi organisation which has been active since the end of the war, either spiriting wanted war criminals out of West Germany, or murdering them if they were thought to be ready to talk.

The recent activities of ODESSA, which takes its code name from "Organisation der ehemaligen SS-Angehörigen" (Organisation of former SS Members), were exclusively disclosed in GERMAN REPORT on September 20th 1963. ODESSA had attempted to spring Professor Heyde from the West German prison where he was awaiting trial. After the failure of the liberation attempt Heyde was transferred to a top-security prison in Butzbach, Hesse province, where he met his death.

The underground organisation ODESSA has used various covernames since its formation in 1945, but is usually described by its original name in police files. In the first years after the war, when SS organisations were being hunted down with some persistence by many allied agencies, ODESSA had to work in the deep underground to get war criminals out of Germany, mainly through Spain to Latin America. Today, when hundreds of leading SS officers hold key posts in nearly all branches of the West German police and secret services, ODESSA is often able to call on the "old-boy-network" for valuable semi-official help.

The death of Professor Heyde made it doubtful whether the long-awaited trial of the nazi euthanasia doctors would open in Limburg, West Germany, on February 18th as scheduled; of the four doctors originally accused, only one was left available to stand trial. Professor Heyde, charged with gassing and poisoning at least 100,000 "useless Germans" ranging from mental patients to concentration camp inmates, was dead; Dr Tillmann, director of the Cologne Orphan Asylum, and one of Heyde's assistants, was also dead; Dr Gerhard Bohne, another assistant, charged with 15,000 killings, was released on bail in early summer 1963 and was spirited away to South America by ODESSA. The sole remaining defendant, Dr Hans Hevelmann, charged with 3000 killings, was out on bail and still alive when this issue of GERMAN REPORT went to press.

Commenting on Professor Heyde's "suicide", State Prosecutor Karl-Heinz Zinnall of the Hesse province prosecutor's office, which has a good record in dealing with nazi crimes, stated: "I believe that certain circles were very much interested in preventing the Heyde trial. There are many doctors who would not like to hear their names, and details of their activities in the nazi period, mentioned in court."

Doctors were not the only people in West Germany interested in Heyde's silence. His trial might well have been embarrassing to public figures right up to the very top, perhaps including West German Defence Minister Kai-Uwe von Hassel. Here is a summary of Heyde's post war career:

ODD TRAFFIC SIGNS

(From "Hamburger Echo", West Germany)

In 1945, Professor Heyde, who held high rank in the SS, was arrested by the Americans. Just before he was due to go on trial in 1947 for his war-time crimes, he escaped with the help of ODESSA. With the aid of the neo-nazi underground he obtained false papers and opened a practice as a doctor in Flensburg under the name of Dr Fritz Sawade. In 1950 he was enrolled as court doctor in the Schleswig-Holstein Provincial Court for Social Welfare Disputes. Recent investigations have shown that a whole range of top Schleswig-Holstein officials knew of Heyde's true identity, knew that he was wanted for mass murder, and kept their mouths shut. According to West German published accounts, the total list of people who were in on the secret double life of Heyde-Sawade included seven university professors, seven senior judges, one federal judge and a number of top civil servants. There have been well-authenticated suggestions that the truth was also known to Kai-Uwe von Hassel, at that time head of the provincial government of Schleswig-Holstein, and today West German Defence Minister.

Finally, in late 1959, the news of Heyde's hide-out got into the hands of West Germans who did not regard mass murder as a venal offence if committed by a member of the establishment, and a warrant had to be issued for his arrest. Once again, ODESSA's excellent connections paid off. Heyde was warned in good time, and disappeared before the warrant could be executed.

For some reason which will probably never now be clarified, the neo-nazi "escape route" did not function properly, and Heyde was arrested in Frankfurt on November 11th 1959.

NEXT "SUICIDE" CANDIDATE?

Well-informed sources in Bonn suggested that ODESSA's next "suicide" candidate might be Hans-Walter Zech-Nenntwich, former SS Lieutenant, now awaiting trial on war crimes charges in West Germany.

Zech-Nenntwich is charged, together with four other members of SS Cavalry Regiment No. 2, with murdering over 5000 Jews in Pinsk, in the occupied Soviet Union, in summer 1941. In a chequered career as a cloak-and-dagger agent, Zech-Nenntwich has incurred the animosity of a whole series of agencies.

Whilst still serving as an SS officer, he got in touch with right-wing Polish resistance fighters in 1943. They smuggled him through Sweden to Britain, where he went to work for British intelligence; his jobs included running a "black" radio programme claiming to come from an anti-Hitler but pro-Himmler "SS resistance movement".

Returning to West Germany after the war, he became a civil servant, and shared an office for a time with Gerhard Schröder, today West German Foreign Minister. In 1950 he called on Adenauer, and presented him with a list of German nationals who had aided the British war effort, a list which he had compiled whilst working for the British.

Later he became a Bonn lobbyist interested in arms contracts, and is believed to have worked both for American and West German secret services. When he was arrested last year he was director of a West German film company.

After Heyde's arrest, a number of his accomplices in the mass war time killings were pulled in, but they were all released on bail whilst awaiting trial. The ODESSA organisation kept its eye on the case; Dr Bohne was smuggled out of West Germany and has disappeared; on September 4th 1963 the West German authorities revealed that Heyde had attempted to make a jail break with outside assistance; on February 12th 1964 Dr Tillmann, out on bail, fell from the eighth storey of a Cologne office-building and the police suggested that he might have been "leaning out of the window to get a breath of fresh air"; on February 13th Professor Heyde allegedly hanged himself in his cell, although he was supposed to be under 24-hour watch in a maximum security prison.

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The "suicide" of Ewald Peters, Chancellor Erhard's security chief, appeared to have no direct connection with the Heyde case, but there were strong indications that it had been arranged by the same neo-nazi circles. Peters was found hanged in his cell in Bonn prison on February 3rd, a few days after he had been arrested on charges of mass murder in the occupied Soviet Union during the war. Peters had recently returned from London and Texas, where he had accompanied Chancellor Erhard on state visits.

He was arrested after being belatedly identified as an officer of the SS "Einsatzgruppe VI" (special extermination squad) which carried out mass executions of Jews in the Rostov-on-Don area of the Soviet Union. Practically no documentation on the activities of this particular Einsatzgruppe is known to have survived the war, and it is assumed that Peters was disposed of because he would have been able to "finger" other members of the unit now holding key posts in West Germany.

Commenting on Peters' death, the London "Tribune" stated on February 7th: "Peters hanged himself at a very convenient time for the Bonn Government. As its former security chief he must have known of, and was almost certainly shielding, other war criminals in the West German civil service".

(Full details of the "euthanasia" killings in nazi Germany and Professor Heyde's role, are given in GERMAN REPORT, March 4th 1960 and September 29th 1961)

"New York Times" on Nazis

The periodic appearance of former Nazis in various Government positions continues to plague the West German Republic like a recurrent sickness.

Just a few days ago, Chancellor Erhard accepted the resignation of Hans Krüger, Minister for Refugee Affairs, who had been accused of presiding over a Nazi court in occupied Poland. Then Dr. Erhard's own security chief, Ewald Peters, was charged by the West German Interior Ministry with misdeeds against Jews in southern Russia, and has now committed suicide in jail. The Adenauer Administration was frequently haunted by the discovery of ex-Nazis within its fold. Partly because of laxity on the part of investigating authorities, partly because of their large numbers, many active Nazis eluded the net of justice after the war. That they are brazenly walking the streets in freedom is bad enough. That even a few of them should find their way into responsible public posts is intolerable.

Apart from the moral considerations, the presence of prominent supporters of the Hitler terror in the Bonn Government offers obvious propaganda material to the Communists and weakens the moral posture of the free world. We can hope that Dr. Erhard will not permit misplaced magnanimity to deter him from cleaning house.

("New York Times", International Edition, February 6th 1964)

Bonn Hinders Berlin Pact

West German Government opposition to sensible relations between West Berlin and the German Democratic Republic threatened, in mid-February, to prevent a renewal of the Berlin Agreement under which West Berliners visited their relatives in East Berlin over Christmas.

Since the original agreement expired on January 5th, official representatives of the GDR and the West Berlin Senate have been meeting regularly to discuss a renewal of the Christmas and New Year visits, which both sides felt had been a success. By February 13th, a wide measure of agreement had been reached on a renewal of the agreement to allow family visits at Easter and Whitsun.

At this point, the Bonn Government intervened. Fearing that if West Berlin "recognised" the GDR by concluding a further agreement with it, other nations would refuse to acquiesce in the Bonn boycott of "non-existent" East Germany, the West German Government brought massive pressure on the West Berlin Senate to reject the new agreement.

On February 14th the Bonn Government and the West Berlin Senate issued a joint statement rejecting the plan for family visits at Easter; as a reason they claimed that the GDR had made demands "which would threaten the political life of West Berlin and the liberty of its citizens."

A GDR spokesman stated that this claim was absolutely untrue; the Easter Agreement proposed by the GDR was, in all essential points, a copy of the Christmas Agreement which the West Berlin Senate had been able to sign.

Here is a short summary of the main moves in the question of family visits since it was mooted in December 1963:

December 17th 1963: Official representatives of the West Berlin Senate and the Government of the GDR sign the Berlin Agreement, under which special arrangements were made for West Berliners to visit relatives in East Berlin during the holiday season. Under the agreement, GDR postal officials issued passes at special offices opened in West Berlin. Over one million visited East Berlin with these passes before the agreement expired on January 5th.

January 4th 1964: Willi Stoph, Acting Prime Minister of the GDR, writes to Willy Brandt, West Berlin Mayor, suggesting that the Berlin Agreement had provided the basis for higher-level talks for the normalisation of relations between the two territories. The West Berlin authorities declined to reply.

January 10th: At one of the regular meetings of the East and West officials responsible for the Christmas Agreement, now discussing its renewal, the West Berlin representative, Horst Korber, makes a number of far-reaching suggestions concerned with the state frontier of the GDR in Berlin and other subjects.

January 17th: At a further meeting State Secretary Erich Wendt, the GDR representative, points out that such problems fall outside the scope of the present discussions which are dealing solely with relatives' visits. These other problems could be discussed at higher-level discussions as proposed by the GDR Government on January 4th. State Secretary Wendt proposes a simple prolongation of the Christmas Agreement, to cover other holiday periods, plus special arrangements for visits in case of sickness, etc.

February 6th: Horst Korber, West Berlin representative, rejects any long-term agreement, but continues to negotiate on the technical modus of a short-term agreement.

February 13th: Erich Wendt, GDR representative, presents the draft of an agreement covering solely the Easter holiday period, as a concession to the West Berlin point of view. All essential provisions are identical with those in the Christmas Agreement; the changes are confined to technical improvements to ensure that West Berliners shall not have to queue for long periods in order to get passes. A very wide measure of agreement is reached on the draft agreement between the two sides.

February 14th: The West Berlin Senate, acting under heaviest pressure from Bonn, announces that the draft Easter Agreement is "not acceptable"; it claims that the GDR had made demands "threatening the liberty of West Berlin citizens".

February 15th: The GDR Government expresses regret at the West Berlin decision, and publishes the full text of the proposed Easter Agreement to show that it contained no political demands of any sort, and that it was practically identical with the Christmas Agreement which had been signed by the West Berlin Senate.

"Thought Control" Case Suspended

The West German court case against Johann Fladung, publisher charged with "subversive activity" because he had campaigned against nuclear arms, was suspended indefinitely on January 30th when Fladung and his wife Klara, the main defendants, were ruled too ill to stand trial. Mr and Mrs Fladung were both tortured by the nazis. Details of the charges in the case were given by GERMAN REPORT on January 24th.

Commenting on the suspension of the case in a leading article on February 8th, "The Times" of London stated:

"There are two main comments to make. First, German democracy should now be sufficiently confident to do without over-zealous protection against those who oppose it. The law has to be applied so long as it is on the statute books, but should be tempered with common sense. In the case of the ailing Herr Fladung it was not. Second, while it would have been impossible to run the country without any former Nazis, there has been too little vigilance in some of the more sensitive professions."

Coventry Visit

Mrs Elsie Jones, deputy Lord Mayor of Coventry, headed a group from that city which spent a week in Dresden during February discussing closer cooperation between trade unionists and young people in the two cities.

Big Changes in GDR Industry

Far-reaching changes in the structure and methods of the socialised industry of the German Democratic Republic were foreshadowed at a meeting of the Central Committee of the Socialist Unity Party in East Berlin at the beginning of February.

Main aim of the reorganisation will be to break away from outdated methods of planning and costing and to adapt the whole economic structure to the latest methods, with particular emphasis on the chemical industry, which is coming to occupy a predominant part in the economic life of the GDR.

The Central Committeee discussed in detail such questions as very-long term planning, including proper provision for the training of scientists and highly-skilled workers who will be needed in ten or twenty years time; proper qualification of experts at all levels in the economic structure; and the granting of more scope for initiative to managers of individual factories and branches of the economy.

One of the most urgent problems, which is already being tackled, is that of proper costing at all stages in industry. Under the present system, basic raw materials such as coal and electricity are still supplied to factories at prices similar to those ruling before the war; since production costs have risen greatly, these prices could only be maintained by big subsidies to prime producers, and these subsidies, and other subsidies granted at various stages of production and finishing, have made proper costing of the finished product difficult if not impossible.

A new price structure for industrial raw materials will now be introduced in stages, beginning in April this year, and this is expected greatly to increase efficiency, and to show which factories and branches of industry have been "coasting along" on subsidised raw materials, and not pulling their proper weight. The new prices for raw materials, it was stressed in Berlin, will not be reflected in higher consumer prices.

Addressing the meeting of the Central Committee, Walter Ulbricht, First Secretary of the Socialist Unity Party, explained some of the difficulties in building a socialist Germany. He stated:

"Looking back on the past developments, we can see what a great task has been accomplished in building socialism in one part of Germany, under the complicated conditions imposed by the direct pressure of monopoly capitalism and revanchism in West Germany.

"When we started, nearly 20 years ago, it was naturally not possible to overcome the results of Hitler's war simply by using economic levers. It was necessary to issue orders, so that the few surviving machines and stocks could be used to the best advantage in reconstruction. In a period of shortages, administrative methods naturally play a major part. Naturally too we had to overcome 'infantile disorders' in the economic field. Our comrades had a difficult time, because most of them had to learn how to run a state and run the economy in the midst of their practical work.

"It cannot be denied that Stalin's theories, and particularly his practice, had negative effects on our economy. I should like to explain this with reference to the law of value. In Stalin's view of political economy the law of value was, roughly speaking, a left-over of capitalism mainly effective in the sphere of circulation, a law which would disappear in the near future... Under such circumstances it was regarded as only a venal sin to infringe against the law of value.

"In our new economic system we regard the law of value as a genuine economic law of socialism, which has its effect on the basis of socialist production relations, and which is most closely linked with these relations; it serves to show us the road which we must take in order to reduce the expenditure of socially necessary work.

"For this reason we do not discuss whether the law of value will disappear in 30 or 50 years, but use it as a sharp weapon in our economic struggle with imperialism.

"In his last period, Stalin relied upon bureaucracy as the method of leadership. If you regard everyone else as incapable, then the only thing to do is to make all the decisions yourself, and depend upon bureaucrats who carry out these decisions slavishly.

"We managed to avoid, relatively speaking, the damaging effects of Stalin's measures because the leadership of our Party relied mainly upon its own analysis of the situation, and based its actions on its own analysis."

GDR MISSION IN ASIA

A GDR goodwill mission headed by Deputy Prime Minister Bruno Leuschner visited a number of countries in South-East Asia in January and February.

In the course of discussions in Indonesia, President Sukarno reiterated the Indonesian government's standpoint that the German problem would have to be solved on the basis of the existence of two German states and peaceful negotiations between them. An expansion of trade relations was discussed.

In Cambodia, Prince Sihanouk, head of the government, stressed that his country pursued a policy of recognition of the existence of two German states. A cultural agreement was signed.

General Ne Win, head of the Burmese government, expressed the view in a talk with Bruno Leuschner during the delegation's visit to Burma that the German problem could only be solved on the basis of recognition of the two German states. More trade between the two countries was mooted.

The GDR delegation visited Ceylon from February 7th to 14th. It was agreed to raise the status of the GDR trade mission in Colombo to that of a Consulate-General. Talks were held on expanding trade and cultural relations between the two countries.

During his visit to India, where he arrived on February 14th, Bruno Leuschner and his delegation met Mr Gulzarilal Nanda, acting Prime Minister, to discuss GDR-Indian relations and international problems, and later made a three-day tour of some Indian towns and villages.

GDR-Zanzibar Link

The Republic of Zanzibar announced recognition of the GDR on January 29th. On February 8th the first GDR diplomatic representative presented his credentials to Mohammed Babu, Zanzibar's Foreign Minister.

The McDermott Plan

British Ex-Diplomat Suggests W. Berlin Solution

The "McDermott Plan" for settling the West Berlin problem, proposed by Geoffrey McDermott, former British Minister in West Berlin, was discussed at a "Forum on World Issues" organised by the National Peace Council in London on February 1st. In view of the importance of this plan, drafted by the man who held the top British post in West Berlin in 1961 and 1962, we reproduce the full text of Mr McDermott's paper below. GERMAN REPORT does not identify itself with Mr McDermott's analysis, or all the suggestions which he makes, but regards the plan as a valuable contribution to the discussion on the future of West Berlin. Further details of this interesting forum in London are given in "Berlin Notebook" on the back page of this issue.

The title to which I have been asked to speak ("Germany – East and West") omits one essential aspect of the whole problem. This is Berlin, which is neither part of West or East Germany. Perhaps this indicates a gap in the thinking of some people in approaching the problem. (The further context shows that when Mr McDermott says "Berlin" he means only West Berlin, ed.)

I will be smug and say "I told you so". What I mean is that developments have, I think, been moving in the direction of the ideas which I first published nearly eighteen months ago and which aroused considerable opposition at the time, particularly in Whitehall and in Bonn. On the other hand they have been well received in communist capitals. I do not claim that they are all original ideas, but I think the package deal which they constitute offers, unlike most other proposed solutions, a reasonable and practicable method of taking the heat off the German problem. Here, in brief, they are.

The agreement would be a provisional one for, say, twenty years, because both sides recognise that German reunification is the eventual aim. It would provide for immediate recognition of the Oder-Neisse frontier, which after all is unlikely ever to be changed except by nuclear war, which will change a good many bigger questions than that. Then the existence of three Germanies – West and East and Berlin – would be formally recognised, and they would be admitted to the United Nations.

Berlin, as an independent entity, would be entitled to make all the economic agreements she wished, and also military agreements to allow the stationing on her soil of any foreign troops except those of West and East Germany. On the vital question of access the routes would be supervised as at present by the Russians: they could claim to act as the agents of the East Germans if they wished. Finally, an important agency of the United Nations such as the Economic and Social Council or the Human Rights Commission, would be stationed in Berlin. Khrushchov has suggested this.

To my mind this is a deal which all concerned could accept with advantage. What is in it for the West? A lot. The presence in existing circumstances of our troops in Berlin, where of course they can be overrun within an hour, on the basis of "right of conquest", is anachronistic, inefficient as they can never take the initiative, and weak too from the propaganda point of view. How much better if they could be there on the basis of a normal treaty of alliance, just as the Americans are in Britain, and we and they in West Germany. Then also the United Nations would gain two pro-western states to one pro-communist. The presence in West Berlin of hundreds of foreign diplomats, including UN diplomats, from all over the world would spread the evil message of the Wall, and I think exert a more positive pressure on its builders to remove it than can in practical terms be otherwise achieved.

In general I think that under this deal West Berlin would be given a sound basis – sounder than at present – for continuing to develop materially and in every other way. As for eventual German reunification, this would remain the aim, and there is no reason why it should be prejudiced by such an agreement. On this it is surprising, but gratifying, that Dr Adenauer in his last days seems to have favoured a somewhat similar arrangement.

Above all, if the communists accepted such an agreement this would have a tremendous effect in relieving tension in two ways. First, we should have a breathing space over the problems of Germany and Berlin and time to think them over more calmly. The clear alternative is that the communists will tweak our tails over these problems whenever they think the time is right, and there is nothing we can do to prevent this. I prophesied long before Cuba that Khrushchov would make further trouble over Berlin whenever he thought fit. The Autobahn incidents, and Khrushchov's lighthearted references to the nuclear war that could have resulted, amply confirmed this. I prophesy the same thing again with equal confidence. Secondly, like that other partial agreement over the test ban, the very fact of agreement at all on a major problem would have an admirable effect.

Before going forward I should comment on one or two aspects of this scheme which tend to confuse thought in the West. While we all recognise the German right to reunification, just like that of the Koreans, Vietnamese (or, as some friends indicate to me should be the case, the Irish) it is a fact that many people in both the West and East are, for historical reasons, none too keen to take any risks to achieve it. This applies to quite a number of the West and East Germans themselves.

Secondly, everyone in the West seems agreed that Ulbricht is a beast, surrounded by beastly stooges. This may well be so, but the conclusions drawn are often fallacious. One, drawn by the Foreign Office to my knowledge for the last ten years or so, is that he is therefore about to be replaced by someone nicer. I have assured my ex-colleagues that they will be proved right one day if they prognosticate this for long enough. Another fallacy is that the administration of the German Democratic Republic and the building and guarding of the repellent Wall, were and are conducted by the Russians. This is not true. The responsibility is German. Of course, the GDR is in the same position as the other members of the Warsaw Pact in that she has large numbers of Soviet forces stationed on her soil because the Soviet

government cannot otherwise be sure of her loyalty.

But, to look again to the future, which is the important thing, it is encouraging that the communist states have been seriously considering an arrangement on the lines I have described, and I believe that something satisfactory could be worked out. Equally encouraging is the fact that there has been some movement in the same direction in the West, and particularly in the U.S.A. It is no longer considered indecent to mention the possibility of a provisional agreement involving three Germanys. Again, it is no longer considered indecent to acknowledge that "the GDR authorities" exist. (They have supervised some 90% of those using the access routes to Berlin for many years, but this has been conveniently overlooked in the West). I forecast that Herr Brandt (West Berlin mayor), a man of great courage and good sense, would be prepared to develop business contacts with them; and we have now seen how he has negotiated with the East German authorities the highly successful and significant Christmas breach in the Wall. We must keep things moving in this direction. In Bonn the old man of the sea is at last off the backs of Chancellor Erhard and Foreign Minister Schroeder and they are moving all the more freely for that.

But we can go farther and faster still. A non-aggression pact between NATO and the Warsaw Pact powers would in a formal sense be unnecessary, but it could do no possible harm to our side and would do good to the extent that it would please the communists. The same would apply to an agreement to exchange observers, though I doubt whether they would achieve much on the ground. But best of all would be military disengagement in the highest degree that may be feasible. I believe it is feasible now to a considerable extent.

What are the main new factors in the case? On the eastern side the Soviet Union is harried by the Chinese and is anxious to make reasonable accomodations with the West. Owing to her immense armoury of weapons of all types she no longer relies on her forward bases to the same extent as before. Moreover, she is not going to let any of her Central European allies disturb the peace — except for an occasional border or Berlin incident — because she knows that, in Europe, this would probably escalate into nuclear war. So any planning which the West may be carrying on to deal with hundreds of thousands of Eastern infantrymen advancing with arms at the port and snow on their boots is totally otiose.

On the Western side also the size and mobility of our armoury means that we need little more than a "tripwire" force in the forward areas. Exercise Big Lift served to emphasise this.

But above all the Cold War, in the old static sense beloved by Foster Dulles and Stalin, is diminishing in importance. Massive confrontations are out. The contest between West and East will continue to be as highly geared as ever. But, given the nuclear balance of terror and the unceasing nuclear arms race, both sides are realising that the top priority objectives lie elsewhere: in disarmament, and in relations with the emerging countries.

These facts should encourage us to greater efforts over Central European problems. On disengagement an encouraging point is that serious plans have been put forward in the past by both West and East (whereas most of the plans for a Berlin settlement have been stalling). The best, to my mind, is that proposed some years ago, and developed since by Poland's Foreign Minister, Mr. Rapacki. This suggests a broad nuclear-free zone in Central Europe, where forces would also be thinned out, under proper inspection on both sides.

I can see nothing but advantage to both sides in such a scheme. The West Germans are bound by treaty to lay off nuclear weapons; and the threat that they might get their hands on them, for instance under projects like the multilateral force, is one of the things on which the Russians are absolutely adamant. If the West Germans get control of nuclear weapons the present thaw is likely to freeze up. The Russian reaction might even be to give the East Germans their share of control of nuclear weapons. Would that really help us at all?

No, the best way in which the West Germans can do their duty in NATO is to refrain from pressing for any control of nuclear weapons; to agree to a broad nuclear-free zone in Central Europe; and to agree to a thinning out of American and British forces while playing a full part with their own. I suggest that American and British forces in Europe could with advantage be cut in half, in return for a similar cut by the Russians. The West Germans for their part should have a greater say in the military strategy of NATO.

I am sorry that much of the weakness of NATO arises from our mistaken thinking on these problems. Who are the two most powerful forces in Europe? The U.S. and the U.S.S.R., of course. Next comes Britain, after her France, then Germany. If we get these priorities wrong the rest follows wrongly. As for NATO, it is a highly important alliance which needs a radical overhaul of its activites in all spheres.

There is nothing that most diplomats love more than a nice status quo. To many it is synonymous with the rule of law. A sad illusion. Every status quo needs to be taken out of its pigeonhole every so often, inspected, and cleaned up; then it is for the statesmen to see whether the situation cannot be improved by negotiation. The situation of the West today as regards Central Europe and Berlin is not even satisfactory in itself. It would be possible to negotiate one that suited both West and East better. The new policy of flexibility and movement in Bonn is a good sign. So are the continuing contacts between the governments of West and East Berlin. So in particular is the Soviet Government's readiness, shown worldwide, to negotiate with the West. Neither democratic capitalism nor communism today is what it was, and a good thing too. The contest will continue, but with clever handling and a dynamic approach by the West, it can be put on a better basis. It will never be "won" outright by either side.

In this brief paper I have left much unsaid. I have tried to indicate some ways, not generally accepted in the West, by which we can and should improve the position in Central Europe, with all the resulting relief of tension far beyond Europe that that would bring. It is a good thing that matters are now moving in this direction. In the present atmosphere they could be made to move faster. None of us has all the time in the world.

West German Troops for Cyprus?

Inclusion of West German troops in a NATO intervention force in Cyprus would be a flagrant violation of the UN Charter, the GDR Foreign Ministry stated on February 7th. If West Germany participated in a multilateral NATO intervention in Cyprus, either by sending troops or by financial aid, this would constitute an open breach of the Potsdam Agreement, the GDR announcement said.

Reports from Bonn indicated that there was a difference of opinion in the West German government on the subject; some ministers thought that the dispatch of West German troops would increase West German prestige, while others feared the effects on world public opinion of dispatching "occupation troops" from West Germany.

GDR Proposals at Geneva

All nuclear arms should be banned in both German states. This was the main theme of a memorandum submitted on February 3rd to the 18-Nation Disarmament Committee in Geneva. The renunciation of nuclear arms by the two German states would not be discrimination against Germany, but would be a genuine contribution to peace by the German people, the memo stated.

The GDR memorandum recalled that the GDR had proposed a nuclear ban treaty to West Germany on January 6th this year. Such a treaty need not involve the recognition of the GDR.

The memo asked the Geneva Disarmament Committee to urge a United Nations ruling that those nations with nuclear weapons on German soil should withdraw then gradually and undertake to regard the two German states as premanently nuclear-free territory.

The GDR memorandum aroused great interest in conference circles. The US representative, William C. Foster, made no attempt to deal with the substance of the proposals, but said that they were unacceptable because they did not come from a "proper government".

For the full text of the draft nuclear arms ban treaty see GERMAN REPORT, January 24th.

"Lost Boy" Found

The child hero of a wartime drama in Buchenwald concentration camp has finally been located after a world-wide search, and has just visited Buchenwald in the GDR, now a memorial to the victims of nazism.

GDR author Bruno Apitz, himself a Buchenwald prisoner, wrote a book, "Naked Among Wolves", telling how anti-nazis from many countries cooperated to save the life of a young Jewish boy held in the camp. The book became a best-seller in Germany and many other countries, and was turned into an outstanding GDR film.

It was a true story, but all trace of the boy had been lost. Now he has been found again; he is Stephan Jerzy Zweig, today a 23-year-old Israeli student studying in Lyon, France. In mid-February he had a reunion in Buchenwald with the men who saved his life, including Willi Bleichert, leading West German trade union official, a Social Democrat, and Bruno Apitz, GDR author, a Communist.

OUR OWN HANSARD

(From the debate in the British House of Commons, February 4th 1964).

Albert Edward Oram (Labour, East Ham South): Will the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs consult the foreign ministers of other NATO powers with a view to agreeing joint action on the relaxation of conditions governing the issue of travel permits to cultural groups from East Germany?

Peter Thomas, Minister of State, Foreign Office (Conservative, Conway): The NATO allies are in regular consultation on this question. Existing restrictions on travel for East Germans are under constant review in the light of circumstances and East German policy.

Mr Oram: The present regulations are, in many ways, contrary to common sense, leading to the exclusion of children's choirs and football teams, with little, if any, political significance. In view of this, should not we and our allies take every possible step open to us to ease the position?

Mr Thomas: These restrictions are under constant review by the NATO allies.

John Mendelson (Labour, Peniston): Can the Minister not go further, and agree that it is rather silly that the Brecht Theatre Company and similar theatre companies, which play in all the festivals in France and other countries which are members of NATO, should be prevented by our Foreign Office from playing in London? Would it not be more sensible to allow the London theatre public to judge whether it is art or not?

Mr Thomas: No. I disagree with the honourable member when he says it is silly. One would like there to be free movement between East and West Berliners. The reason that these restrictions were imposed was, as he knows, because we and our NATO allies wished to show our abhorrence of the wall which was erected in Berlin. The people who are allowed out from East Germany are only those whom the East German authorities think will serve their purpose.

Christopher Mayhew (Labour, Woolwich East): Nevertheless, it would be strange if we found ourselves cooperating with the East German Government in keeping East German people behind the wall. Granted that we are acting in unity with NATO on this point, but is there not a plain distinction between a choir or some kind of cultural visit, and recognition of East Germany? Cannot we be more discriminating and more constructive about this with our NATO allies?

Mr Thomas: These restrictions are under constant review by NATO, and they are applied with some flexibility. It is undoubtedly right at the moment that we should not simply allow those people to come out of East Germany who are allowed out to serve the purpose of the East German authorities to afford them greater recognition.

* * *

(From the debate in the British House of Commons, February 10th.)

Alice Bacon (Labour, South-East Leeds): Will the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs reconsider his decision not to grant visas to a party of staff and students of the Engineering Hochschule in Karl Marx Stadt in order that they might pay a visit to Leeds in return for two visits paid by the Leeds College of Technology to Germany?

Robert Mathew, Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs (Conservative, Honiton): The restrictions are an agreed NATO policy . . .

Christopher Mayhew (Labour, Woolwich East): Should we not be more discriminating? How is it possible to let East Germans, with the maximum publicity, compete in the winter Olympic Games, and cut out facilities of this kind? Could we not have a sensible discriminating policy which allows East Germans to visit the west if they wish?

Mr Mathew: A number of visits did take place. The policy is very sensibly applied.

* * *

GERMAN REPORT comments: Two points were overlooked in these parliamentary exchanges:

1. The reference to "abhorrence of the wall" is a perfect case of "post hoc ergo propter hoc". British visas were often refused to non-political GDR visitors long before the Berlin frontier was closed in August 1961.

2. The British Government is being more Papal than the Pope on this question; theatre companies, choirs and orchestras from the GDR frequently appear in West Germany and vice versa.

BERLIN NOTEBOOK

By John Peet

On another page we reprint some interesting suggestions for a solution of the West Berlin problem made by Geoffrey McDermott, the former British diplomat. GERMAN REPORT printed details of earlier versions of this plan on October 12th 1962 and August 9th 1963. Lots of people have tabled plans for solving the German problem, but the McDermott proposals obviously have a very special status, since their author is the very model of an "Establishment" Briton, and as senior British representative in West Berlin in 1961 and 1962 he had direct access to all the off-the-record western thinking on the subject.

The forum in London at which the latest version of the "McDermott Plan" was presented (Mr McDermott was unable to be present in person) was organised by the National Peace Council, a highly respectable organisation of which Labour MP Reginald Sorenson is chairman. The forum, held under the title "Germany — East and West" was attended by men and women from a very wide range of organisations, from the Federation of University Conservative Organisations to the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament.

Speakers

When the National Peace Council decided to organise the meeting, they thought it would be a good idea to invite speakers who could present, with some authority, the views of both East and West Germany. There was no difficulty in getting a West German representative; West Germany maintains a large embassy in London, and Herr T. Stetzenmuller of the press department was booked as a speaker.

To get someone who could give the views of the GDR was obviously more difficult; there is no GDR embassy in London, and the British Government would be very unlikely, to say the least of it, to grant a visa to an official GDR representative for this purpose. However, the forum organisers found a way out; as a British citizen I can visit Britain without let or hindrance, so they very kindly asked me whether I could speak on the policies of the GDR. Glad of the chance to make an unscheduled trip to London, I agreed.

This produced an unexpected impasse. The West German diplomat, working apparently on the theory that he might disappear in a cloud of red smoke if he sat down at the speaker's table with somebody from the GDR (even though I am a harmless and fairly pacific British journalist and not an ogre-like official representative of the non-existent GDR), decided that he should keep his diplomatic vest whiter than white and stay away.

We got on very nicely without him, and I think that everyone present agreed that it was a fruitful discussion. The absence of the West German official only emphasised the unrealistic attitude towards the German problem which still, unfortunately, rules the roost in Bonn.

Strangelove

Many readers in Britain and other countries will already have seen, or will soon be seeing, the new Stanley Kubrick film with the record title "Dr Strangelove, or How to Stop Worrying and Learn to Love the Bomb". For those who have not heard of this film, I should explain that it is a gripping, funny and very persuasive parable about a right-wing American general who launches a nuclear attack on the Soviet Union off his own bat.

The English actor Peter Sellers gives an outstanding performance in several roles. In one role he is an RAF officer attached to US Strategic Air HQ, who does his best to stop World War Three; in another he is Doctor Strangelove, a nazi scientist working for the Americans who repeatedly addresses the US President as "Mein Führer", and who is obviously delighted at the idea of a nuclear holocaust.

After seeing the film recently in London, I bought a West German newspaper, and promptly discovered that reality was outdoing art. The newspaper informed me that Colonel Heinz Schuhmacher of the West German Luftwaffe had just been appointed West German liaison officer at the US Strategic Air HQ at Omaha; Colonel Schuhmacher, like all other senior officers of the Bundeswehr, served as an officer in the nazi Wehrmacht. I would feel happier if I knew that Colonel Schumacher was really just actor Peter Sellers in another disguise, but I fear he is real.

Forger

On January 24th, GERMAN REPORT was able to report exclusively that SS Major Bernhard Krüger, the man who forged enormous quantities of Bank of England notes during the war to help the nazi war effort, had finally been located in West Germany. Krüger was not only a forger on an historic scale; he also murdered at least four of the concentration inmates forced to do the dirty work. We are glad to report that news has now come in from West Germany that official investigations of the case have been opened, as a result of murder charges lodged by Julius Mader, GDR journalist who tracked him down. The investigation is in the hands of the Cologne office for the investigation of nazi crimes, an office which has the rather long-winded title "Zentralstelle für die Bearbeitung Nationalsozialistischer Massenverbrechen in Konzentrationslagern für Nordrhein-Westfalen — Landgericht Köln". We shall keep an eye on the case, and hope to be able to report future developments.

"All Your Fault"

The accused in the West German trial of SS guards and other officials at Auschwitz death camp are producing most of the old tired arguments in their defence, ranging from the assertion that they knew nothing about the mass murders to the claim that they were only acting on orders. On January 30th, Dr Viktor Capesius, who was in charge of the pharmacy in the camp, came up with quite a new argument, which deserves to be recorded.

There would not have been so many deaths in the camp, he claimed, if the British and Americans had supplied DDT through the International Red Cross, and thus made it possible to keep the lice under control.

Satchmo

The "House of German-Soviet Friendship" in East Berlin does all the usual things you might expect; it runs Russian language classes, screens Soviet films, conducts lectures, and so on. But leafing through its February programme I discovered a couple of scheduled events which show that it casts its net fairly wide: one was a lecture on "Satchmo — King of Jazz", illustrated with records of the music of Louis Armstrong; the other was an evening of entertainment featuring, amongst other groups, "Papa Binnes and his Hot Five".

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